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Abstract. Increasing impatience reduces search efforts of unemployed job seekers and therefore decreases the 
exit rate from unemployment. Also, impatience reduces reservation wage and increases the exit rate. To 
determine the overall effect of impatience on the exit rate from unemployment, we distinguish between 
exponential and hyperbolic time preferences. Search effort dominates the reservation wage and decreases the exit 
rate from unemployment if individuals have hyperbolic, rather than exponential, preferences. Using the French 
sample of the European Household Panel Survey, we found that search effort has a strong effect on the duration 
of unemployment, whereas the reservation wage is not significant. This result shows that the job seekers have 
hyperbolic preferences. Hyperbolic preferences affect problems associated with job search and policies aimed at 
reducing unemployment.  
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1. Introduction  
Sequential models of job search make it possible to make predictions about the 
equilibrium of the influence of observable and unobservable individual characteristics on the 
exit rate from unemployment. In this literature, time preference is a significant factor, because 
it defines the level of the reservation wage as well as the intensity of the job search. We are 
interested in the observation, reported in many studies, of a great acceleration of the exit rate 
from unemployment near the completion date of unemployment benefits. This phenomenon 
may be taken an indication that unemployed workers have modified the conditions of their 
intertemporal trade-offs. However, in the literature on the modelling of time preference 
(Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Harris and Laibson, 2001), the effect of impatience on job 
seeking has attracted little attention in recent years, even though it is closely related to the 
theory of job search. 
The investigation of the influence of time discounting on the equilibrium properties of 
models of job search, which view search effort as endogenous (Mortensen, 1986), generally 
does not reveal a determinate effect on the exit rate from unemployment. On the one hand, 
increased time discounting (impatience)
1
 leads an unemployed worker to attach little 
importance to the advantages of job search. Thus, the unemployed worker exerts little effort 
on job search. This behaviour tends to result in fewer job offers being received and to increase 
the duration of unemployment. On the other hand, increased time discounting also leads to a 
lower reservation wage and hence shortens the duration of unemployment. Impatient 
unemployed worker prefers to accept an offer of employment immediately, rather than wait 
for an additional period to receive a better offer. This effect tends to reduce the duration of 
unemployment and it is opposed to the effect of a fall of the intensity of search.  This standard 
result, often cited in the specific literature, is due to the relatively simple modelling of the 
time consistency that is retained in the majority of the models. At the same time, an increasing 
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number of researchers have been interested in testing the time consistency of agents, generally 
by conducting experiments in the laboratory, starting from exponential or hyperbolic 
discounting function (Laibson, 1997; O‟Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Cox and Oaxaca, 1989, 
1992). 
The Discounted Utility (DU) model (Samuelson, 1937), which is often used by 
economists, has received a modicum of support from empirical research. Empirical research 
on intertemporal choice has revealed that the DU model is inadequate as a descriptive model 
of behaviour in a number of respects. This model shows that an individual who has 
intertemporal preferences represented by an exponential discounting function makes 
consistent choices and that his preferences are never reversed, which implies a constant 
discount rate through time. However, the studies of Pender (1996) and Chapman (1996) show 
that discount rates are not constant over time, but appear to decline. This pattern often referred 
to as hyperbolic discounting. The term „hyperbolic discounting‟ is often used to denote a 
decrease in impatience over time, with a high discount rate in the short run and a low one in 
the long run. The existence of this phenomenon has been confirmed by the studies of Myerson 
and Green (1995) and Kirby (1997)
2
. The hyperbolic discounting function contradicts the 
assumption of the time consistency of preferences (Fang and Silverman, 2004) and supports 
the decrease of impatience over time. 
Hyperbolic time preferences have enormous implications for labour market policies. 
Hyperbolic worker is particularly sensitive to the immediate costs of the job search and seeks 
to reap the benefits of search quickly by accepting a job offer in the near future. 
Consequently, job-search programmes can help hyperbolic workers by finding a way to 
reduce the short-term costs of job search. It may also be possible to use interactive kiosks, 
where potential job applicants can submit their curriculum vitae and also schedule an 
interview at low cost to themselves. The interactive kiosks could coordinate between the 
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various actors who help the applicant to gain employment. If costs represent a barrier for the 
search of hyperbolic job seekers, the availability of such interactive kiosks will encourage 
them to keep looking. 
This paper reports on an empirical study of the effects of impatience on job search 
outcomes. The originality of this paper is to compare our results obtained from the French 
data with the results of Della-Vigna and Paserman (2005) on U.S. data. More impatient 
workers search less intensively and set a lower reservation wage. The effect of these tactics on 
the exit rate from unemployment is unclear. In their study, Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) 
distinguish between different types of time preference: exponential and hyperbolic. They also 
distinguish between short-run and long-run impatience. The search decision involves a trade-
off between immediate search costs and the future benefits of accepting an offer made within 
a few weeks. Over this limited time frame, variation in short-run impatience matters more 
than variation in long-run impatience. In contrast, the decision concerning the reservation 
wage involves comparing the long-term consequences of obtaining a certain wage or waiting 
to receive an even better offer. In this case, variation in long-term discounting is more 
significant than variation in short-term discounting. According to the exponential discounting 
model, job seekers are concerned more with long-run impatience than short-run impatience. 
In this case, the effect of the reservation wage will dominate the level of the search effort, 
because the decision on the reservation wage depends only on long-run impatience. 
Accordingly, job seekers who become more impatient tend to exit from unemployment more 
quickly, because they lower their reservation wage. On the other hand, according to the 
hyperbolic discounting model, job seekers are more prone to be impatient in the short run than 
in the long run.  In this case, the effect of the search effort will dominate the level of the 
reservation wage, because the search decision depends only on short-run impatience. 
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Therefore, job seekers who become more impatient tend to exit from unemployment more 
slowly, because they expend less effort on search.  
Using the French sample of the European Household Panel Survey, we test these 
theoretical predictions empirically. We find that various measures of impatience are 
correlated negatively with search effort and the reservation wage. This result shows that when 
job seekers become more impatient, they tend to expend less effort on search and to lower the 
reservation wage. We also show that search effort has a strong effect on the exit rate from 
unemployment, whereas the effect of reservation wage is not significant. This result shows 
that individuals have hyperbolic preferences. Consequently, when they become more 
impatient, they exit from unemployment more slowly because they reduce the amount of 
effort on job search.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the various 
assumptions made by the model of Della Vigna and Paserman (2005). In Section 3, we 
provide a descriptive analysis of the data, the choice of the impatience measures, and a 
nonparametric analysis of the effects of these measures on survival function in 
unemployment. In Section 4, we demonstrate the estimation and principal results. Section 5 
concludes by summarizing the main results. 
 
2. The search model of Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) 
 
We now examine the various assumptions made by the model of Della Vigna and 
Paserman (2005)
3
. In their model, search effort is endogenous
4
 and determines the probability 
of receiving a wage offer in any period. Hence, the job seeker expends search effort s, 
parameterized as the probability of obtaining a job offer. Therefore, )1,0(s . The probability 
of receiving a job offer during a sequence of searches is an increasing function of the intensity 
of search effort, but an increase in the search effort also augments the cost of the search. In 
 6 
each period, the job seeker incurs a cost of searching  c s  with 0)(' sc and 0)0( c . The 
job offer is characterized by a wage w . The structure of time preferences of Laibson (1997), 
Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollak (1968), is used as a simplification of hyperbolic time 
preferences. Let )(
t
cu  denote the stream of per period utility that is derived from 
consumption. The present value of a flow of future utilities at time t  is 
t
T
t
t
uu 


1
0
 . 
)1,0( is a parameter that reflects short-run patience and   is the discount factor that 
captures long-run patience. When 1 , the rate of time preferences is constant and 
preferences are time-consistent, which is the standard exponential discounting case. When 
)1,0( , time preferences are quasi-hyperbolic
5
. The discount factor between the current 
period t  and the next one 1t  is  , while the discount factor between any two periods in 
the future is  . With the structure of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, suppose that 9.0  and 
99.0 . In the current period t , a reward of 10  that starts to materialize in period 3t is 
preferred to a reward of 9  that starts at period 2t  ( 910 23   ). When period 
2t arrives, this preference is reversed by the same individual as 109  . In other words, 
quasi-hyperbolic time preferences involve problems of self control
6. Following O‟Donoghue 
and Rabin (1999), we distinguish between sophisticated and naive individuals, where the 
former are aware of their self-control problems and the latter are not.  A naive hyperbolic 
individual believes incorrectly that in the future she will behave as an exponential individual 
with 1 . Sophisticated individuals predict the behaviour of their future selves perfectly. 
The job seeker chooses a level of search effort and a wage acceptance policy to solve the 
optimisation programme: 
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where :b is the benefits of unemployment,   :
t
sc  is the cost of search, :  is short-run 
patience, :  is long-run patience, :
t
s  is the probability of receiving an employment offer in 
period t ,   :
1
wV
E
t
 is the continuation payoff of employment if the job seeker accepts a wage 
offer, and :
1V
U
t 
 is the continuation payoff  of unemployment if the job seeker rejects a wage 
offer or does not receive a wage offer. 
     Let us now study the various assumptions that can be derived from the resolution of this 
model. These assumptions are used to determine the nature of the correlation between 
impatience and the search effort, between impatience and the reservation wage, and between 
impatience and the exit rate from unemployment. These assumptions will be tested 
empirically using French data from the European Household Panel Survey. 
- Hypothesis 1. At equilibrium, there is a negative correlation between impatience and the 
search effort. Search effort is strictly decreasing with short-run impatience )1(   and long-
run impatience )1(   for exponential ( 1 ) and hyperbolic job seekers ( 1 ) with the 
same long-run discount factor . 
- Hypothesis 2. For exponential and hyperbolic agent, the reservation wage is strictly 
decreasing with long-run impatience )1(  . The reservation wage is strictly decreasing with 
short-run impatience )1(   for sophisticated hyperbolic job seekers with 1  and is 
independent of short-run impatience )1(   for naive job seekers. 
- Hypothesis 3. The exit rate from unemployment is strictly decreasing with short-run 
impatience for naive job seekers. For sophisticated job seekers, the exit rate is also strictly 
decreasing with short-run impatience if 
                                                



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1
1]/[
x
xWWE
 at *wx                                              [2] 
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Given that short-run impatience affects the search effort directly, increasing  1  tends to 
decrease the exit rate from unemployment through the decrease in search effort.  
- Hypothesis 4. Taking into account that there is a probability that a job seeker who finds 
work will be laid off, the exit rate from unemployment is increasing with long-run 
impatience  1  if   is quite high (close to 1) and for plausible values of the layoff 
probability
7
. Given that long-run impatience affects the reservation wage directly, 
increasing  1  tends to increase the exit rate from unemployment through the decrease in 
the reservation wage. 
The main objective of the empirical study reported in this paper is to test the predictions 
of this model using French longitudinal data. The results of this empirical part will help us to 
identify the nature of the time preferences of the job seekers in the sample and to remove the 
uncertainty of the effect of impatience on exit rate from unemployment. If job seekers have 
exponential preferences )1(  , impatience increases the exit rate from unemployment and if 
they have hyperbolic preferences )1(  , impatience decreases the exit rate from 
unemployment. Knowing the type of time preferences that job seekers have can help to guide 
the formulation of labour market policies to reduce unemployment. 
 
3. Data and non-parametric analysis 
 
The data used comes from the French sample of the European Household Panel Survey 
conducted by Eurostat, and covers eight waves of study from 1994 to 2001 (Table 1). This 
longitudinal survey can be used to trace the history of job seekers on the labour market 
retrospectively. It provides complete information on the characteristics of individual job 
seekers and household structures.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean  Standard Errors Observations 
Age     
Age  34.280 11.5328 2161 
Class 1 [<25] 0.2693 0.4437 2161 
Class 2 [25–35] 0.2915 0.4545 2161 
Class 3 [35–45] 0.2008 0.4007 2161 
Class 4 [45–55] 0.1864 0.3895 2161 
Class 5 [55 +] 0.0518 0.2217  
Gender    
Men 0.4595 0.4984 2161 
Marital Status    
Married  0.3937 0.4887 2161 
Skill Level    
No education 0.1170 0.3215 2161 
General education 0.1591 0.3659 2161 
Short Technical education 0.3012 0.4589 2161 
Long Technical education 0.0814 0.2735 2161 
University degree 0.1962 0.3972 2161 
Region    
Rural Town 0.2697 0.4439 2161 
< 20,000 inhabitants 0.1522 0.3593   2161 
20,000–100,000 inhabitants 0.1485 0.3557 2161 
> 100,000 inhabitants 0.3109 0.4629 2161 
Paris 0.1184 0.3232 2161 
Impatience measures    
No Bank account 0.4885 0.5000 2161 
No Life insurance 0.6500 0.4771 2161 
Smoking 0.2145 0.4106 2161 
Consuming one‟s income and incurring debt 0.0693 0.2541 2161 
No Contribution to humanitarian associations 0.7659 0.4236 2161 
Other variables    
Reservation wage 6.5598 2.6742 2161 
Number of search methods 2.3678 0.7985 2161 
Unemployed compensated (unemployment benefits) 0.6598 0.4738 2161 
Log (income per household member) 8.0718 0.6204 2161 
 
 
     The panel monitors, for each individual, the timing of unemployment spells in each wave. 
It provides complete information on the characteristics of individual job seekers and 
household structures. The incidence of unemployment spells by individuals and by 
observation creates a sample of 2161 observations. The analysis of individual spells of 
unemployment shows 68.84% complete spells. The number of individual spells of 
unemployment registered varies between one and 12; the average is 1.96 with the average 
length being 7.35 months. Job seekers who received unemployment benefits represent 65% of 
the sample. Women accounted for 54% of the sample. The average age for the whole sample 
is 34 years. While the share of graduates from higher education is close to 20%, there is still a 
higher proportion of graduates from short-term technical education, such as the Certificate of 
Professional Aptitude or the Diploma of Professional Studies. The average hourly reservation 
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wage is around 6.56 euros. Thirty-one percent of the sample live in a region with more than 
100,000 inhabitants.  
We now explain our choice of impatience measures. In the past, time preferences were 
often measured by experimental studies, in which people are asked to evaluate stylized 
intertemporal prospects that involve choice tasks
8
 (Cox and Oaxaca 1989, 1990). Impatient 
individuals prefer to receive immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs in a way that 
our ‟long-run selves‟ do not appreciate (O‟Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Conversely, patient 
individuals prefer activities that have immediate costs and delayed benefits. Does behaviour 
that privileges a present or shorter-term solution constitute proof that people have a preference 
for the present (impatience) or that they simply have an aversion to risk? It may prove 
difficult to differentiate between impatience and risk aversion completely, because the 
correlation between these two factors cannot be denied. Individuals who are strongly risk-
averse are also very impatient (Anderhub and al., 2001). We collected information on the 
French data of the European Household Panel Survey in order to construct measures of 
impatience. Three assumptions were used in our empirical study: (i) impatience measures do 
not distinguish between short-run and long-run impatience; (ii) the discount rate does not 
change between the activities; and (iii) the level of impatience does not vary over time. Our 
measures may be imperfect proxies for impatience and they may pick out a number of other 
individual traits (e.g., tastes for leisure, or risk preferences) in addition to time preferences. 
An explanation of why individuals prefer to consume today rather than tomorrow must appeal 
to a more specific phenomenon, one‟s psychological nature. To improve the quality of our 
study, we attempted to control for these various factors in our choice of impatience measures. 
The proxies that we selected are as follows: 
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Having a bank account: A simple model of saving behaviour predicts that individuals who are 
more patient delay consumption and accumulate more wealth.  Therefore, they are more likely 
to have some type of bank account. 51.15% of individuals in the sample had a bank account.  
Contribution to humanitarian associations: This type of behaviour characterizes patient 
individuals. Contributing to associations for the benefit of society, rather than for personal 
gain, indicates patience. This type of individual has long-term vision and seeks to prepare 
better conditions for future generations. Individuals who do not contribute to humanitarian 
associations are strongly represented in the sample (76%). 
Smoking
9
: This activity is pleasurable at the time of consumption but detrimental to health in 
the long term. An impatient individual (smoker) will be satisfied with the short-term benefit 
without assigning importance to the long-term disadvantage. Daily smokers represent 21.45% 
of the sample. 
Consuming one’s income and incurring debt: Having difficulty in keeping to one‟s budget 
and incurring debt due to consumption can be related to impatience. An impatient person 
thinks less at the moment of purchase, and exposes him- or herself to exceeding the limits of 
his or her budget. Such individuals represent only 7% of the sample. 
Life insurance: The individuals who subscribe to a life insurance policy have a preference for 
the long term and show a weak preference for the present. Individuals who do not have life 
insurance represent 65% of the sample.  
In order to homogenize impatience measures, we transformed them into reduced 
centred values. This process of standardizing data has the advantage of homogenizing data 
without changing the results of various statistical analyses. The analysis of correlation 
between the impatience measures shows that among 10 pairwise correlations, nine have a 
positive sign and are statistically different from zero (Table 2).  
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Table 2. Correlation of impatience measures 
 
 
 
 
No Bank account 
No Life insurance 
 
 
Smoking 
 
Consuming one‟s 
income and 
incurring debt 
No Contribution to 
humanitarian 
associations 
No Bank account 1.000     
No Life insurance 
0.2032          
(0.0000) 
1.000    
Smoking 
0.5853 
(0.0000) 
0.1677       
(0.0000) 
1.000   
Consuming one‟s income and 
incurring debt 
0.1450         
(0.0000) 
0.0849       
(0.0001) 
0.1060 
(0.0000) 
1.000  
No Contribution to 
humanitarian associations 
0.1214         
(0.0000) 
0.0685        
(0.0015) 
0.0854 
(0.0001) 
0.0414    
(0.0541) 
1.000 
  
 
        To measure the quality of the measure, we used Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient. A statistical 
index varies between 0 and 1, which is used to evaluate the homogeneity or consistency of an 
instrument. The value of Cronbach‟s alpha coefficient was 0.536, which reflects an average 
correlation between the measures of 0.06. Both measures are very similar to those of Drago 
(2006) and Della Vigna and Paserman (2005)
10
. We determined an aggregate measure of 
impatience with factor analysis by using the five standardized proxies describe above. Factor 
analysis aims at reducing a significant amount of information to a few large dimensions. It is a 
statistical method that is used to describe variability among observed variables (
n
xxx ,...,,
21
) 
in terms of fewer unobserved variables called factors. The observed variables are modelled as 
linear combinations of a set of common factors (
Q
FF , ... ,
1
, with PQ  ) and a unique factor 
 
P
Y  for each variable: 
                          ), ... ,2,1(               ... 
21 21
NnYuFaFaFaX
nnQnnnp Q
                        [3] 
      We estimated a factor model via maximum likelihood (Harman 1976, ch.10) using the 
measures of impatience. The results are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
Table 3. Factor Analysis, Aggregate Measure of Impatience 
 
 
Impatience measures Factor Loadings Uniqueness Score 
No Bank account 0.1461 0.9786 0.0906 
No Life insurance 0.4151 0.7757 0.1502 
Smoking 0.2060 0.9401 0.0920 
Consuming one‟s income and incurring debt 0.1371 0.7179 0.3451 
No Contribution to humanitarian associations 0.1552 0.9425 0.1083 
 
      We retained only one factor. For this factor, all factor loadings have positive signs. Our 
conjecture was that this factor is impatience. The score coefficient was used to create the 
aggregate measure of impatience, which is a weighted average of the individual variables. The 
measures that received the most weight are consuming one‟s income and incurring debt, and 
life insurance. 
      Given that the data set does not contain information on search intensity per se, we used 
the following search methods used by the job seeker to define a measure of search intensity: 
(1) registration at the public employment agency, (2) personal steps taken to find a job 
(searching through newspapers, word of mouth from friends and relatives, direct contact with 
possible employers, etc.), and (3) contact with the public employment agency and following a 
programme of individual support. The average number of methods used by each unemployed 
person is 2.36.  
 The reservation wage is defined as the minimum wage below which an unemployed 
person refuses a job offer. The reservation wage is an important determinant of the probability 
that an unemployed person will exit unemployment. Nevertheless, direct information about 
the reservation wage is scarce
11
. However, having the reservation wage determined by the 
unemployed person him- or herself opens other possibilities. The way in which the French 
data of the European Household Panel Survey is collected includes asking the unemployed 
about the minimum hourly wage for which they would go to work. The unemployed are asked 
initially about the number of hours that they would like to work per week, then about the 
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minimum wages that they would accept for the number of hours that they have just declared. 
The direct use of the answers to these questions raises difficulties about the sincerity of the 
statements (Feldstein and Poterba, 1984). However, a majority of previous studies have 
agreed to consider this type of response as relevant information on the behaviour of labour 
supply (Ridder and Gorter, 1986; Jones, 1988). Indeed, the distribution of the reservation 
wage seems to be consistent with the mean and variance observed in wages in France (Table 
1). To supplement the descriptive analysis of the sample, survival rates in unemployment 
were estimated by means of a Kaplan-Meier estimation (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function in unemployment 
 
 
 
      The aggregate impatience measure is continuous variable. We distinguished between job 
seekers with low impatience, characterized as unemployed patient (1st quartile), and job 
seekers with high impatience, characterized as unemployed impatient (bottom quartile). The 
results of this estimation enable us to compare the survival function in unemployment 
between patient (impatience =0) and impatient job seekers (impatience =1). We show that the 
survival curve for a patient job seeker is below that of an impatient job seeker. The non-
 15 
parametric estimation (Kaplan-Meier) gives us an idea of the effect of impatience on survival 
function in unemployment: patient job seekers stay less in unemployment than impatient. 
 
4. Estimation 
 
 
At each period, the job seeker chooses his search effort and his reservation wages.  These 
two variables determine the probability of exiting unemployment. As we saw in the 
theoretical model of Della Vigna and Paserman (2005), there is a correlation between job 
seekers‟ impatience and (a) their search effort, and (b) their reservation wages. The global 
effect of impatience on the exit rate from unemployment is unclear. The estimation results 
will enable us to determine the nature of the correlation between impatience and search effort, 
impatience and reservation wages, and impatience and exit rate from unemployment. 
4.1   Impatience and search effort 
      We now determine the nature of the correlation between impatience and search intensity. 
The equation for search effort is as follows: 
                                         
iii
IMPIntensity   )(X 
'
1i
'
11
                                           [4] 
where 
i
Intensity  is search intensity, 
i
X is the vector of explanatory variables, and 
i
IMP  is 
impatience measures. The econometric model that best fits this situation is the Poisson model 
as the dependent variable; the number of search methods is a non-negative integer
12
. For this 
estimation, we use socio-demographic variables: level of education, number of inhabitants in 
the region, household income per person, the reception of unemployment benefits, and 
impatience measures. For the search effort equation (4), we conduct two separate estimates. In 
the first estimation, we use impatience measures and in the second we use the aggregate 
impatience measure. Both estimates allow us to compare the results of the effect of 
impatience. The estimation results of the equation of search effort are reported in Table 4 
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(columns 1 and 2, for the impatience measures and the aggregate impatience measure, 
respectively). 
      Not having a bank account, not having life insurance, and smoking have a significant and 
negative effect on search effort. Most of the impatience measures show a strong negative 
correlation between impatience and search effort. This result is confirmed by the second 
estimation using the aggregate impatience measure. These results confirm theoretical 
predictions; there is a negative correlation between impatience and search effort. The US data 
used by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) shows that search effort is correlated negatively 
with impatience. For the other explanatory variables, age has a significant negative effect on 
search effort. Men tend to expend more effort on search than women. Receiving 
unemployment benefit has a significant and negative effect on search effort. Compensated 
individuals expend less effort on search than those who are not. 
4.2   Impatience and reservation wage 
      The determination of the reservation wage requires comparing the long-term 
consequences of obtaining a certain wage with the wait to receive a better offer. In this case, 
contrary to the decision on the level of search effort, the variation of long-run impatience 
dominates the variation of short-run impatience. The equation for the reservation wage is as 
follows: 
                                       
iii
IMPWLog   )(X )(
'
2i
'
22
,                                             [5] 
where )(
i
WLog  is the log of reservation wage, 
i
X  is the vector of explanatory variables, 
and
i
IMP  is the impatience measures. Using the Ordinary Least Square method (OLS), we 
determine, on the one hand, the effect of impatience on the reservation wage and, on the other 
hand, the effect of other variables on the reservation wage. 
      The results of this estimation (Table 4, columns 3 and 4) help to test the correlation 
between impatience and the reservation wage
13
. The first estimate (column 3) uses the 
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impatience measures, while the second estimate (column 4) uses the aggregate impatience 
measure. Not having a bank account, not having life insurance, or not subscribing to 
humanitarian associations has a significant and negative effect on the reservation wage. Most 
of the impatience measures show a strong negative correlation between impatience and the 
reservation wage. This result is confirmed by the sign and the significance of the coefficient 
of the aggregate impatience measure (column 4). This confirms previous results and shows 
that workers who are more impatient set a lower reservation wage. We can now confirm the 
theoretical predictions; there is a negative correlation between impatience and the reservation 
wage. Data from the US used by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005), in an analysis that does 
not include the control variables (age, education, marital status, etc.), shows that the 
reservation wage is correlated negatively with impatience. This correlation was not significant 
after including the control variables. Our result is different and could be due to the possibility 
that the measures of impatience are reflecting other dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity 
(for example, heterogeneity in human capital). 
 The income per household member and age, independently, had a significant and positive 
effect on the reservation wage. The effect on the reservation wage increases as the age of the 
individual increases. Men specify a higher reservation wage than women. When they are 
married, both men and women lower their reservation wage. It is also noted that the 
reservation wage grows steadily with the level of education. Individuals who had higher 
education specified a higher reservation wage than individuals with a lower standard of 
education (taken as a reference). Individuals who live in rural areas or cities that have fewer 
than 100,000 inhabitants tend to specify a lower reservation wage than those who live in the 
Paris region. 
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4.3   Search effort, reservation wage, and exit rate from unemployment  
To determine the nature of the correlation between (a) search effort and the exit rate from 
unemployment, and (b) between reservation wage and the exit rate, a semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazard model was used (Cox, 1972). This type of model allows all the standard 
determinants to be controlled for. It also allows duration dependence, which is the pure effect 
of the duration of unemployment on the probability of moving to employment, to be 
controlled for. The hazard model utilizes data on the sequence, timing, and the state that an 
individual is in; the probability of the type of exit is a function of time. This is referred to as 
the hazard rate or function. The hazard rate is the dependent variable, and the relationship 
between this rate and a variety of observed and unobserved variables is modelled. The hazard 
model has been widely used in biomedical and social science research, by Cox (1972), 
Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980), and Heckman and Singer (1984). As before, let Ti be a 
nonnegative random variable that denoted the duration of unemployment for individual i. We 
now define  th
i
, the hazard at time t for individual i, as follows: 
                                           
 
t
tTttTt
th ii
t
i




/Pr
lim
0
                                  [6] 
Thus, this equation gives the probability that a job seeker will exit from unemployment 
between t and tt  , under the condition that the job seeker had not already died by time t. 
In order to estimate the exit rate from unemployment and the effects of independent variables 
on this, we need to specify the functional form of the hazard model. The most widely used 
specifications are the accelerated time model and the Cox proportional hazard model. 
According to the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972), covariates have a multiplicative 
relationship with the hazard function (the proportionality assumption), which causes them to 
shift the hazard function up or downward. Therefore, covariates do not affect the duration of 
 19 
an activity directly
14
. Given that we are studying the effect of explanatory variables on the 
exit from unemployment, a Cox proportional hazard model is used. It is specified by 
                                                    
iii
xthXth  exp)(   
0
                                                    [7]                               
where
i
t is the elapsed duration of unemployment for individual i;  Xth
i
/  denotes the hazard 
rate conditional on a vector of covariates X; )(
0
th  denotes the baseline hazard function 
measuring the effects of the time that has passed since becoming unemployed on the 
probability of moving to another state; and 
i
x  denotes the covariates and parameter 
estimates for the exit rate.  
The results of the determinants of the exit rate of unemployment are given in Table 4 
(column 5 and 6). The first estimate (column 5) presents the correlation between the 
reservation wage and the exit rate, while the second estimate (column 6) identifies the 
correlation between search effort and the exit rate, using a Cox proportional hazard model. 
      The search effort has a significant effect on the exit rate from unemployment. Individuals 
who expend more search effort exit from unemployment after a shorter time (Result 1). The 
reservation wage does not have a significant effect on the exit rate from unemployment 
(Result 2). Taken together, Results 1 and 2 show us that the effect of the search effort 
dominates the effect of the reservation wage: this implies that individuals who are more 
impatient expend less effort on search and so may exit from unemployment more slowly. 
Given that the effect of search effort dominates the level of reservation wage, we may 
conclude that the job seekers in our sample exhibit hyperbolic, rather than exponential, 
preferences. This last result shows that job seekers are more concerned by short-term 
impatience rather than by long-term impatience. Given this result, job-search programmes 
should reduce the short-term costs of research, which are immediately supported. Job seekers 
who belong to age group 2 [25–35 years] and group 5 [55; +] remain unemployed for longer 
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than job seekers who belong to age group 1 [<25 years] (taken as a reference). The probability 
of men exiting unemployment is higher than that of women. We also note that job seekers 
who are married exit unemployment more slowly. Job seekers who have a university degree 
exit unemployment more quickly than individuals who are uneducated (taken as a reference). 
Job seekers who live in areas with a population of 20,000 to 100,000 are unemployed for 
shorter periods than those who live in the Paris region. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on hyperbolic discounting. A second contribution 
of this paper is to compare our results on French data with the results of Della Vigna and 
Paserman on U.S. data. This comparison gave us an idea about the time preferences type of 
unemployed in both countries and policies that can be applied to reduce unemployment. 
Within a model that views search effort as endogenous, increasing impatience implies a 
reduction in search efforts and therefore reduces the exit rate from unemployment. At the 
same time, impatience increases the reservation wage and it reduces the exit rate from 
unemployment. The overall effect of impatience on the exit rate is unclear and requires a 
comparison of the relative strengths of effects. The effect of search effort dominates the 
reservation wage if job seekers have hyperbolic preferences, while the reservation wage 
dominates search effort if job seekers have exponential preferences. Put differently, the exit 
rate increases if the job seekers have hyperbolic preferences and decreases if they have 
exponential preferences. In the empirical test, we found that impatience measures are 
correlated negatively with the reservation wage and search effort. The results of the Cox 
proportional hazard model show that search effort has a positive effect on the exit rate from 
unemployment, whereas the reservation wage does not have a significant effect. This final 
result informs us about the nature of job seekers‟ time preferences. Given that the effect of 
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search effort dominates the effect of reservation wages, we may conclude that the job seekers 
exhibit hyperbolic, rather than exponential discount.  
The effectiveness of policies whose objective is to reduce unemployment depends on the 
nature of the time preferences of the unemployed. Hyperbolic preferences affect problems 
associated with job search and policies aimed at reducing unemployment. Hyperbolic agents 
are particularly sensitive to the immediate costs of job search (including contacting employers 
to obtain an interview, calling relatives, etc.). To reduce the immediate costs of the search to 
the job seeker, public employment services in France should follow up the unemployed more 
efficiently so that they may obtain information that will help them to reduce the costs of job 
search. France is exceptional because there are many heterogeneous actors and authorities of 
different status, which the job seeker must consult several times to stay informed. The 
creation of „houses of employment‟ could provide an opportunity to establish some basic 
principles for active policies to allow fluidity between unemployment and reemployment. 
This can be achieved by the effective reduction of the costs borne by the unemployed. 
Interactive kiosks could also be set up, where job seekers can submit their curriculum vitae 
and schedule interviews at low cost. This administrative simplification for job seekers is now 
available in nearly all Western countries. However, such simplification is exceptionally slow 
in France. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4: Search effort, Reservation wage, and Exit rate from unemployment  
 
 Search effort Reservation wage Exit rate from unemployment 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
Reservation wage  - - 
- 
- 
     -0.0673 
(0.0465) 
- 
Search effort  - - 
- 
- 
  0.1566*** 
(0.0458) 
Aggregate impatience measure - 
-0.0239* 
(0.0132) 
- -0.0231** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0627*** 
            (0.0122) 
-0.0836*** 
            (0.0109) 
Impatience measures       
No Bank account 
   -0.0795*** 
(0.0114) 
- 
-0.0530** 
        (0.0219) 
- - - 
No Life insurance 
-0.0438* 
(0.0232) 
- 
-0.0586** 
(0.0227) 
- - - 
Smoking 
  -0.0709*** 
(0.0126) 
- 
0.0631 
(0.0450) 
- - - 
Consuming one‟s income and 
incurring debt 
0.0278 
(0.0750) 
- 
0.0021 
(0.0420) 
- - - 
No contribution to humanitarian 
associations 
-0.0240 
(0.0447) 
- 
-0.0912*** 
(0.0249) 
- - - 
Log (income per household 
member) 
-0.0366 
(0.0342) 
-0.0468 
(0.0335) 
   0.1162*** 
 (0.0180) 
   0.1195*** 
(0.0179) 
-0.1260** 
            (0.0642) 
     -0.1234* 
            (0.0725) 
Unemployment benefits 
    -0.1260** 
(0.0435) 
    -0.1239** 
(0.0434) 
0.0285 
(0.0224) 
0.0265 
(0.0235) 
-0.0474*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0469*** 
            (0.0119) 
Age        
Class 1 [<25] Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Class 2 [25–35] 
-0.0667 
(0.0531) 
   -0.0647*** 
(0.0253) 
0.0745** 
(0.0274) 
 0.0703** 
(0.0277) 
-0.3551** 
(0.0974) 
-0.3547*** 
(0.0967) 
Class 3 [35–45] 
-0.0301  
     (0.0638)         
   -0.1234*** 
(0.0337) 
0.1353*** 
(0.0310) 
  0.1269*** 
(0.0335) 
      -0.0886 
(0.0725) 
     -0.0718 
(0.0727) 
Class 4 [45–55] 
   -0.1257*  
(0.0727)  
   -0.1443*** 
(0.0349) 
0.1970*** 
(0.0339) 
  0.1821*** 
(0.0378) 
      -0.1162 
(0.1105) 
     -0.1019 
(0.1075) 
Class 5 [55 +] 
    -0.2629** 
(0.1052)     
   -0.2570*** 
(0.0948) 
0.3158*** 
(0.0491) 
  0.3038*** 
(0.0516) 
   -0.5666*** 
(0.1206) 
-0.5666*** 
(0.1206) 
Gender       
Men 
    0.1169** 
(0.0399) 
    0.1723*** 
(0.0395) 
0.1604*** 
(0.0200) 
  0.1621*** 
(0.0205) 
    0.3979*** 
(0.1373) 
0.3918*** 
(0.1389) 
Women Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Marital Status       
Married 
-0.0273 
(0.0479) 
-0.0076 
(0.0247) 
    -0.0509* 
(0.0285) 
-0.0521* 
(0.0284) 
-0.1360** 
(0.0642) 
    -0.1373** 
(0.0661) 
Others Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Skill Level       
No education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
General education 
-0.0503 
(0.0658) 
-0.0516 
(0.0657) 
    -0.0299 
(0.0337)   
-0.0307 
(0.0331) 
      -0.0423 
(0.0662)   
    -0.0431 
(0.0606)   
Short Technical education 
-0.0328 
(0.0515) 
-0.0385 
(0.0517) 
    -0.0392   
(0.0272) 
-0.0314 
(0.0269) 
0.0153 
(0.0736) 
      0.0138 
(0.0752) 
Long Technical education 
-0.0170 
(0.0515) 
-0.0185 
(0.0515)  
0.0213 
(0.0408) 
0.0237 
(0.0398) 
-0.0591 
(0.0856) 
    -0.0591 
(0.0870) 
University degree 
-0.0328 
(0.0574) 
  0.0327 
(0.0573) 
   0.1495*** 
(0.0298) 
   0.1520*** 
(0.0281) 
   0.1729** 
(0.0831) 
      0.1774** 
(0.0881) 
Region       
Rural Town 
-0.0143 
(0.0565) 
  0.0113 
(0.0566) 
-0.0399* 
(0.0242) 
-0.0744** 
(0.0363) 
0.0143 
(0.0705) 
      0.0149 
(0.0739) 
< 20,000 inhabitants 
0.0013 
(0.0756) 
-0.0015 
(0.0758) 
     -0.04906* 
(0.0294) 
-0.0836** 
(0.0399) 
0.0293 
(0.0611) 
      0.0231 
(0.0692) 
20,000–100,000 inhabitants 
0.0138 
(0.0364) 
 0.0136 
(0.0363) 
    -0.07099** 
(0.0293) 
-0.1078** 
(0.0397) 
    0.2002*** 
(0.0533)  
0.1925*** 
(0.0518)  
> 100,000 inhabitants 
-0.0175 
(0.0668) 
-0.0172 
(0.0671)  
-0.0506 
(0.0296) 
-0.0461 
(0.0349) 
0.0387 
(0.0790) 
      0.0368 
(0.0785) 
Paris Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Constant 
1.1642*** 
(0.3081) 
1.1084*** 
(0.2901) 
    3.6792*** 
(0.0504) 
     3.6357*** 
(0.0483) 
- - 
Log-Likelihood -1843.8174 -1844.1065 - -    -4822.081 -4815.1527 
Numbers of observation 2161 2161 2161 2161 2161 2161 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, *: significant at the 0.1 level, **: significant at the 0.5 level, ***: significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 An individual with high time discounting is assumed to be impatient, while an individual with low time 
discounting is assumed to be patient.  
2
 This inconsistency is presented by the following situation. When confronted with the choice between two 
payments that are close in time, for example, $10 today or $11 tomorrow, many agents prefer $10 today and 
thus demonstrate a remarkably high discount rate. However, given a longer time scale, most agents choose 
to take $11 in 101 days instead of $10 in 100 days, even though the period between the payments is still just 
one day. 
3
 For more details, see Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) pp. 531-544. 
4
 It is common in the literature to view search effort as endogenous (Burdett and Mortensen, 1978; Mortensen 
1986; Albrecht, Holmlund, and Lang 1991) 
5
 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is an approximation of hyperbolic time preferences (Phelps and Pollack, 1968; 
Laibson, 1997). Such preferences imply a lower discount factor when the delay horizon is short (short-run 
impatience) than when the delay horizon is long (long-run impatience) and generate problems of self-control 
and time-inconsistency in a simple fashion.  
6
 Many empirical regularities regarding consumption (Angeletos and al., 2001; Laibson, 1997), drug addiction 
(Gruber and Koszegi, 2001), and unemployed worker behaviour (Paserman, 2004), among others, are 
explained better in terms of quasi-hyperbolic preferences than in terms of time-consistent preferences.  
7
 For more details, see Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) pp.538-540 
8
 Respondents‟ answers to the question “Which would you prefer: $100 today or $150 one year from today? 
9
 An individual was treated as a smoker if he declared himself to be a daily smoker and not a casual smoker. 
10
 Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) show that there is a low correlation between measures of an 
individual trait. The correlation can be reduced by a measurement error in the choice of impatience 
measures, but this should not alter the sign. 
11
 There is little empirical data to confirm or disconfirm this theoretical concept. In the absence of direct 
observation, study that seeks to evaluate the effect of the reservation wage on the duration of unemployment 
supposes that the relation, predicted by the theory of job search, which relates it to the level of the 
unemployment benefits, the arrival rate of offers, and the distribution of the wages offered, is well checked. 
The reservation wage can then be estimated by using information available on these variables.  
12
 We estimated the equation of search effort using the binomial negative model. According to the coefficient of 
sur-dispersion (alpha), we retain the Poisson model. 
13
 We use the same list of the variables used in the estimation in the equation for search effort. 
14
 In contrast, the accelerated time model (Cox and Oakes, 1984) assumes that covariates act multiplicatively on 
time rather than on the hazard function. Covariates, therefore, increase or decrease the time spent on an 
activity. 
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